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1 
Producing trust among illicit 
actors: a techno-social 
approach to an online illicit 
market 
Abstract 
Illicit market exchanges in cybercriminal markets are plagued by problems of verifiability and 
enforceability: trust is one way to ensure reliable exchange. It is fragile and hard to establish. 
One way to do that is to use the administrative structure of the market to control 
transactions.  This is common among a specific type of market, darknet cryptomarkets. These 
are sites for the sale of illicit goods and services, hosted anonymously using the Tor darknet. 
However reliance on the technology and the market administrators exposes users to 
excessive risk. We examine a case of a market that rejects several key technological features 
now common in cryptomarkets, but is nonetheless reliable and robust. We apply a techno-
social approach that looks at the way participants use and combine technologies with social 
relationships. Methods were designed to capture the interactional context of the illicit 
market. We aimed to examine both person to person interaction and the technical 
infrastructure the market relied on. We find that it maintains itself through a shared common 
security orientation, community participation in key decisions about products sold, 
performing trust signalling and lateral trust between members. There are implications for 
how resilience in cryptomarkets is understood.  
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Trust has been called a part of the deep structure of social life (Lewis and Weigert, 1985) and 
a response to the risk inherent in cooperation with others (Luhmann, 2000). It is thought to 
depend on characteristics of social closeness and institutional robustness. Relationships 
conducted online present a challenge for maintaining trust as trustful actors can be 
impersonated and trust signals faked to little cost for the malicious actor. That is particularly 
important for online illicit market exchanges where there is a strong incentive to falsify and 
where the cost of doing so is low and the sanctions limited. Licit online markets and social 
media tend to substitute technical features such as likes, followership and reviews for the 
workings of interpersonal trust. This is difficult for participants in illicit online markets, who 
need to disguise their identities and where there is no incentive to stick to agreements. Yet 
these markets operate robustly and even embed moral sanctioning within them (redacted). 
There is a strong emphasis on technical and cultural competence with illicit markets which is 
attained through a combination of mutual sanctioning and avoidance of technological fixes 
to problems of communication and anonymisation. Trust is then moved from a problem of 
quality assessment and transactional reliability to one of relational embedding (Beckert and 
Wehinger, 2012). This paper is about the balance between technical features of illicit online 
communities, their social embedding, and the paradox whereby more technically ‘sparse’ 
settings can lead to more reliable interactions. The paper takes one critical case, that of a 
darknet illicit drug market we have dubbed ‘PsychForum market’ (PFM).  
The solution to the trust paradox is thought to lie either technically in the use of reputation 
mechanisms in open online markets specifically designed for the purpose, exemplified by 
darknet cryptomarkets (Barratt and Aldridge, 2016; Martin, 2014), or relationally in 
contractual agreements in closed, private markets (van Wegberg et al., 2018).  In these closed 
markets trust signalling performance is necessary to be recognised as a legitimate actor 
(Gambetta, 1988). In the cryptomarkets there is a high turnover of vendors and buyers, so 
direct trust signalling is less effective.  Community evaluations of participants are more 
significant and each most markets have a discussion forum where vendors and buyers 
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participate. To be involved successfully participants must be skilled at interpreting the signals 
and traces made by others (Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2016). 
Cryptomarkets are typically hosted using the Tor darknet. Tor allows for anonymised hosting 
where users and hosts cannot easily be located. Payments can be made via the Bitcoin 
cryptocurrency payment system which allows for a degree of anonymity when used for this 
purpose. Encryption underlies these technologies. The Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) encryption 
standard allows for closed communication over otherwise open networks. Cryptomarkets 
appear as shopfronts, with lists of products for sale (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014), 
typically a range of illicit drugs and other illegal electronic services (Afilipoaie and Shortis, 
2015). The administrators regulate what can be sold on the market and take a cut of sales. 
The cryptomarkets mediate the ‘last mile’ of the drug trade, the part of the supply chain going 
from wholesalers to dealers (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2016) and to a lesser extent from 
dealers to consumers (Demant et al., 2018; Dittus et al., 2017). Further distribution then takes 
place in person or through social media (Moyle et al., 2019). They allow dealers and buyers 
to solve coordination problems common to illicit markets (Bakken et al., 2018; Beckert and 
Dewey, 2017). They are relatively resilient in the face of disruption from law enforcement and 
rivals (Van Buskirk et al., 2017), partly due to the technical features of the darknet, but also 
to economically rational and ideological commitments from users (Ladegaard, 2017). 
Those entering the markets must find ways to manage risks. The markets themselves usually 
offer third party dispute resolution (Morselli et al., 2017). Such systems, however, have 
shown themselves to be technically robust but socially brittle. Vendors who have previously 
been known as trustworthy have disappeared overnight, taking their customers’ money with 
them. Mostly, trust is build up through a commitment to repeat purchase (Décary-Hétu and 
Quessy-Doré, 2017). The growing threats from both law enforcement and hostile actors have 
shifted the market power structure away from consumers and towards vendors, so more 
powerful vendors can use the system to push risk back onto the consumer (Moeller et al., 
2017). As well as altering the economic and social structure of the drug market they have an 
impact on normative interaction, promoting both prosocial displays (Martin, 2017) and a 
‘rational consumer’ stance by participants (Barratt, Lenton, et al., 2016).  In comparison, we 
explore a system of building and maintaining trust that is technically unsophisticated but 
socially resilient, in which users have a shared commitment to the market as a community. 
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PFM has outlasted many apparently more technically better designed or financially successful 
markets. It eschews centralised technical features such as reputation systems and centralised 
payment clearance, it has minimal price or advert based trust signalling, yet it undoubtedly 
works well. This indicates that some technical and interpersonal features of illicit online 
markets that are held by their user communities to be central to their success are neither 
necessary nor sufficient conditions for them to work. In practice they require a committed, 
culturally integrated community to function (Dodd, 2018). Key to PFM’s function is its cultural 
performance and signification in which technical competence and personal identity are 
articulated together to create a common interactional space. The paper shows the process of 
performance and contestation that an illicit online market uses to produce trust.   
Context and Methodology  
The study was designed to capture the interactional context of an illicit market. We aimed to 
examine both interactions and the technical infrastructure of the market (Stratton et al., 
2017). We observed how cryptomarket users interacted with each other, and how these 
interactions contributed to social sanctioning and the creation of shared norms and 
agreements in the market. We captured changes over time in the market and observe the 
dynamics of knowledge production and evaluation that we hypothesised were central to the 
market processes working effectively. We took an ethnographic approach involving 5 months 
observation of interactions in PFM in the second half of 2017. This was a time when morale 
in the cryptomarket ecosystem was at a low ebb (Ladegaard, 2018). Two major markets were 
closed down by law enforcement (LE) and one was subject to an exit scam.  
Initial themes were written up from the observations. We copied the forum text into a 
database and coded the textual data in the light of the initial themes. We then returned to 
the market for a further observation period in order to check the coding themes and note 
how PFM had responded to internal and external changes. External changes consisted of the 
collapse of other cryptomarkets during this period due to scams and law enforcement led 
shutdowns. Internal changes came in response to an influx of new users and proposals to 
adopt new drugs for sale. In response to the large number of new users the administrators 
closed registrations for a time as the numbers were too great to permit any kind of security 
checking process. During the data collection phase the team also observed other discussion 
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forums such as Reddit threads dedicated to cryptomarkets in order to track changes in PFM 
against the wider cryptomarket ecosystem. 
PFM was selected as a case because its design emphasises the centrality of interaction and 
the users’ assessment of whom to trust, when and to what extent. It is a hybrid of discussion 
forum and market focused on community approved psychedelic drugs. Two characteristics of 
our case are significant. First, PFM does not offer centralised, integrated secure payment such 
as escrow or auto-encryption functions commonly emblematic of cryptomarkets. Instead, 
users personally contact vendors through manually PGP-encrypted private messages. Second, 
the administrators and key users of the PFM specifically restrict the kinds of drugs which can 
be advertised to a select set of psychedelics – consciousness altering drugs typically used for 
self-exploration. This latter feature was crucial for us. It means that there is continual 
contestation and engagement over which drugs are sold and which are proscribed.  
Ethical approval was obtained from the University ethics review committee. The PFM 
administrators were contacted initially in order to make them aware of the research project, 
but no return contact was established. In order to protect what is a fragile ecosystem and the 
privacy expectations of users, we have pseudonymised and also obfuscate text-based quotes 
and usernames in order to prevent identification. Cryptomarkets are of interest to law 
enforcement, as a growing area of illicit activity that appears to be both openly accessible and 
beyond the reach of traditional investigation methods. As the location of both the markets 
and their users is uncertain, it is unclear what legal and normative frameworks govern 
research into them. Martin and Christin (2016) develop the ethical domains defined by 
Whiteman (2012) in online research. The ethics of the academy are the commonly held claims 
and norms governing ethics in research. Some aspects of this domain are grounded in pre-
existing understandings about the distinction between public and private, and it is often 
assumed that this is a simple and consistent distinction which researchers can respect. 
However in online research there may be varied norms and assumptions at work. Researchers 
may treat as public conversations which the participants assume are private.  Observing PFM 
participants it was apparent that there was a generalised awareness that the discussions were 
open and not private so it was considered ethical to make use of this data. The ethics of the 
researcher is the disciplinary and personal stance adopted by researchers towards the field. 
We take the view that cryptomarkets are illegal but self governing and largely not harm 
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producing, and should be taken seriously as communities of practice which regulate their 
members. Therefore we take the view that research should contribute to showing the range 
of behaviours and personae within PFM and also accept that moral and pro-social activity can 
be part of cryptomarket interaction. That leads us into the ethics of the researched, their 
personal motivations and boundaries. We noted that maintaining PFM as a coherent, 
effective entity was important to the participants as was spreading the gospel of psychedelic 
drug experience. Their ethics included respecting privacy and taking responsibility for 
personal security. To a large extent that meshed with our approach. Finally the ethics of the 
institution present a challenge. British universities promote high impact research and that 
tends to be framed in research that serves the interests and priorities of public institutions. 
Our approach is informed by tenets of sociology that addresses a range of publics, including 
communities that are considered to be deviant or lawbreaking.  There has been extensive 
discussion about whether cryptomarkets can reduce or increase drug harms (Barratt, Ferris, 
et al., 2016; Barratt, Lenton, et al., 2016; Mounteney et al., 2017). Researchers should not 
make an a priori assumption as to what effect they have and therefore what ‘side’ we should 
take. We can use our methods to elaborate on the motives and experiences of cryptomarket 
users and put the impact of cryptomarkets on the drug trade and drug use culture in context. 
Findings: The Market Forum as a Status Group 
PFM has the appearance of a basic internet discussion forum. It consists of a large number of 
discussion threads, has few adornments, and carries no adverts (Figure 1). This presentation 
is part of the general approach of the market. It operates as a bounded collective, a grouping 
of individuals who share a particular life-style, a distinctive psychedelic culture, and 
idiosyncratic notions of social esteem and honour. It emphasises the responsibility of each 
participant for their own security and safety, and their obligation to the community. PFM is 
maintained by a small grouping of administrators who also emphasise that they will not take 
responsibility for losses or errors by users. The main focus of discussion is psychedelic drugs 
and drug experiences, but users also post extensively on other topics such as the state of the 
darknet, other markets and bitcoin (Figure 2). 
Threads focus on the reliability of different drug vendors, the products for sale, scientific 
knowledge and personal experiences with specific types of drugs, debates around personal 
security – called ‘operational security’ or opsec - and harm reduction. There is no immediate 
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distinction between vendor and buyers. Other cryptomarkets allow buyers to rate vendors 
performance. Instead of vendor ratings, all PFM members are rated by status markers which 
are linked to expectations and restrictions on the behaviour of group members. These are: 
the quantity of their contributions to forum threads, symbolic feedback in the form of 
compliments and reports embodied in “Karma”, awards (e.g. ‘Wizard’ or ‘Connoisseurs Club’), 
and status markers such as ‘Elder’ or ‘Newbie’. Such group status markers are indicators of 
the shared common stock of knowledge and accepted practices which constitute this 
particular group culture as a shared life-world. We argue that trustworthiness is one such 
marker in the PFM community, both influencing and emerging as a product of interaction 
between users: administrators/moderators, vendors, and other members. Maintaining this 
sense of a flat organisational system is vital to ensuring that participants do not rely on the 
market administrators for the market to function. 
Why I came here in the first place was the reviews of sellers and drugs which folk 
were uploading. I enjoy that the forum is like a distributed governing agency which 
completely has everyone’s backs covered. The forest grew from a bunch of sound 
folks’ aim to develop the purity of the drugs we all love so much, and while doing 
so supporting and nurturing the users of said drugs. It is the reason for me being 
into hallucinogenic before I discovered the internet. You need people who have an 
eye for quality and for the risks people are in, who can put that before money. So 
awesome to see there’s this global group targeted on taking liability, avoiding risks, 
being in good spirits about it and telling everyone who needs to know. Big thumbs 
up! Forum user, Wastis. 
In contrast to more centralised cryptomarkets, the PFM ethos encourages problems to be 
resolved through discussions between buyers and vendors. Users understand that they are 
buying into this approach when they joint the market: 
I at the moment have shown up due to not getting what I ordered last month from 
[Vendor] to MidWest USA. It was just a few stickers of LSD. I expect it’ll be sorted 
between us, I’ve taken my time as we’re in holiday mode. I messaged the vendor a 
few days past, radio silence for now. I’ll hold back and have another go on this place 
and the vendor’s own message board. Forum user, Finetime.  
Lines of communication are kept open between administrators and users during times of 
crisis in order to maintain the fabric of trust that sustains the capacity of PFM to fulfil its role 
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as a forum and space to purchase drugs. When PFM was subject to multiple distributed denial 
of service (DDOS) attacks, the administrators moved the market to another host until they 
were able to bring the site back up as we noted in the Reddit discussion. Given the intrinsically 
precarious and potentially compromised nature of cryptomarkets, one might ask why 
anybody would trust a darknet forum enough to interact with other individuals and 
potentially purchase illicit drugs through it. In this first section we will explore how individual 
users relate to the idea of trusting the forum and its administrators, as well as how those 
administrators along with experienced users and vendors discuss and enforce opsec norms 
upon new users. 
Enforcing a common security orientation 
PFM users noted that reliance on centralised trust promoting technology such as escrow 
payment systems and market based encryption services created significant risks of 
compromise by law enforcement. They eschewed some of this technology in favour of 
embedded personal relationships and a shared orientation to security. An administrator  
welcome post exhorts how new users ought to both use and treat the forum: 
Number one, the main point: educate yourselves about the risks you are 
taking. 
Never show your true ID, other than when one to one with a seller who you 
have checked out 
No open internet data like social media or gmail 
Encrypt everything. 
This places the burden upon the buyer to induct themselves with respect to the vendors from 
whom they purchase and the various security measures that they ought to implement. They 
are expected to possess or acquire skills in using encryption for communication (e.g. 
generating a public and private PGP key). There are numerous links to those measures, 
including how-tos for PGP encryption and bitcoin tumbling (a form of money laundering). The 
administration team took the decision to enforce a rule that all private messages must be 
manually encrypted, rather than encrypted automatically by the market’s own system as is 
typical of other cryptomarkets, and to ban users who repeatedly flout this rule as otherwise 
“again and again it is clear everyone defaults to the easy path instead of the secure one 
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.” The admin references the recent registration shutdown, saying “Should ourselves let the 
market be accessible then the community has to be an unsafe space for the police should 
they get into and take it over … all crypto places should have taken steps like that in the time 
after the Silk Road [the first cryptomarket] was seized 
”. The encryption mandate is backed up by rhetoric that asks users to act as though the forum 
is already compromised, putting no trust whatsoever in those who run it to keep them safe if 
they were to make any mistakes: “'Work under the knowledge that LE is targeting PFM and it 
is best to act as if it has already been taken over by them. Act like that when dealing with 
everything on the darknet.”  
The act of telling users not to trust blindly paradoxically demonstrates trust in the community. 
It demonstrates a care for users that goes beyond the functional. There is a degree of 
community solidarity, rooted in a common feeling of marginalisation and repression both as 
a result of the war on drugs at large and the specific context of recent LE crackdowns. This 
contrasts with more predatory criminal forums, where those who get caught tend to be 
written off as simply bad or careless criminals. This is the kind of sympathy is displayed by the 
same reddit user quoted above, who states “doubt anyone likes it when LE takes its victories 
even when they are up against idiots. Better the idiots than LE!”. Solidarity emerges as a 
function of the kind of community that the administrators try to create, which prioritises harm 
reduction and risk mitigation. It is also pragmatically necessary for the community to work. It 
is simply bad business to have one’s customers arrested and the downfall of a vendor has the 
potential to poison the whole community. 
The forum design is meant to winnow out higher risk users in three ways. The first is through 
a dedicated “Newbie Corner” with a 50 post minimum before users can go onto the main 
forum described as “the filter through which we can isolate and filter would be scammers, 
annoyances, and shams. Newbie corner helps make PFM work smoothly and nicely for 
everyone.” Users confirm: “Rules like the 50 post one usually wind me up but truth be told it 
works and I’m partial to it. It gives this place the sense that it’s a shared space, I can find out 
who I can Interact with and rely on, and it lets me get a feel for the people on here. Even 
when it’s Tor, you should know your neighbourhood.” The quality of engagement of members 
and their contribution to the community (e.g. the helpfulness of their contributions, helping 
out, etc.) can be evaluated and acknowledged - individually through Karma points, and more 
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comprehensively through awards (e.g. ‘Awesome Contributor’, ‘Quickest Responses’ or 
‘Critical Update Provider’).  
The second is to make the space unfriendly to occasional retail users who may be less capable 
and less skilled. In contrast with more commodified cryptomarkets which attempt to render 
the process of signing up and purchasing drugs as simple as possible, PFM forces new users 
to learn the ropes. It provides the resources for them to do so, but the administrators 
straightforwardly refuse to do the work for them. In the long run this may be safer than retail 
markets which let users sink or swim. A further impact is that administrators, vendors and 
ordinary users are better able to trust users who have remained and made purchases, safe in 
the knowledge that they are likely to have educated themselves in opsec. 
The third is to restrict the intake of new users. A PGP-signed message from a forum moderator 
was posted after registrations had been re-opened following a long closure: 
So we can manage and limit the flood of recent intakes, there will be case 
by case confirmation of newbies by the administrators. We are doing that 
to ensure that you are all encrypting things properly and maintaining the 
rules that are there for everyone’s wellbeing. 
In this instance we see that they are prepared to compromise short-term membership gains 
and potential revenue in order to secure the site against both hacking and law enforcement 
incursion. In the words of the most prominent advocate for opsec in the forum community, 
when asked whether there could possibly be exceptions for the encrypted private messages 
rule: “Don’t be daft, ENCRYPT FROM BEGINNING TO END. No DISCUSSION on this front. A 
simple message on the open internet has been enough to land some folks in prison.”  
Trust performance and negotiation 
Trust is cultivated, mediated, performed and negotiated between vendors, users, and 
administrators.  PFM has no escrow system, meaning that buyers are expected to pay before 
the product is shipped to them. That should mean that buyers are taking on a very high risk 
as there is little incentive for the vendor to deliver as promised. However the system appears 
to work well. PFM places heavy emphasis upon the diligent scrutiny of vendor applications by 
the administrators as well as upon the importance of user reviews of vendors. It also means 
that vendors act as if they are obligated to PFM as a whole to produce the drugs as promised. 
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So there is a working mutual obligation that is not underpinned by any technical system in 
place. It is largely driven by word of mouth reputation. 
A non-escrow model puts the buyer at risk of “selective scamming” from the seller (a practice 
where vendors will fail to ship, say, 1/100 items and keep the money, with no possibility of it 
being verified as a scam rather than law enforcement confiscating the package or it getting 
lost in the post). However, it also protects users from the possibility of an exit scam, where 
the marketplace owner steals all of the money in escrow and users’ wallets in a certain period. 
One way of framing this issue is that escrow based cryptomarkets require users to trust the 
market owner not to run away with a lot of money, whereas non-escrow models only require 
users to trust vendors not to run away with a much smaller amount of money (whilst losing 
all possibility of operating as a vendor again). Users note that the reputation system on 
cryptomarkets is easily gamed, and that the reviews posted on this forum are a better 
indicator of quality: “Fantastic the way that we buy straight from vendors and keep them 
honest without any nonsense salesforce advertising and reputation fluffing. Three times I 
have been exit scammed or markets have disappeared. Better to be one on one with a 
vendor..”  
This closer relationship means buyers enjoy having contact with vendors. One says, “It’s 
enjoyable gassing with sellers. I’ll be more relaxed when making a purchase and it means they 
might get a bit extra from me – like a good Uber drive. We both come out on top.” Others 
wish to observe vendors’ interactions with other buyers, so that they can “make it so sellers 
that are doing business with me are ones that give a nod to their buyer’s health and safety as 
well as their profit margins”. This user cares not only about the quality of their product, but 
also the way that vendors treat their customers and whether they “appreciate that the drugs 
they are selling can make people’s lives better”. Many users want “have a one to one bond 
with buyers we can rely on so the substances we buy are dependable and quality”. 
That generates a positive feedback loop. Users are quick to praise vendors whom they deem 
to have gone above and beyond in the service they have provided. One user recounts an 
experience they have had with OmegaOgre, a large vendor of psychedelics:  
While ago I bought from OO but didn’t heard anything. After a lot of confusion when I finally 
got communicating with him, RIGHT AWAY he gave me the option of my money back or the 
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goods, at his own expense. And I had made so many mistakes in going about things the right 
way. You are my top seller, you give me delight and drugs and I want everyone to know. 
The vendor-buyer relationship is mediated by the forum administrators. There are sections 
of the forum dedicated to “rogue vendors” who are now blacklisted as a result of having 
scammed users, providing poor quality product, or disappearing for significant periods of 
time. Moderators on the forum willingly mediate complaints between users and vendors, 
particularly when those complaints become numerous. In one notable instance, the 
administrators made a public announcement that “Following much thought and reflection, 
based on what we know and what’s been passed to us, with some reluctance we post this 
warning for anyone who has bought from Suicide Squad”. The post says they “take this action 
with sadness” but wish to prioritise the “security of the forum and everyone who might have 
exchanged with them”.  
The post goes on, “There is no way of him demonstrating that he isn't under heavy manners 
to anyone's satisfaction. There's no evidence he could offer.” The trust that was once present 
can never be regained. “we have together outlawed everyone in that team, none of them can 
participate in the forum now.” asks the moderator. They conclude that “we have together 
outlawed everyone in that team, none of them can participate in the forum now.” The 
banning of all of the vendor’s team partly functions to protect the community from LE who 
may have control of their accounts, but it also serves to close the door on the incident. There 
is no coming back from this loss of trust. 
There are lingering questions in the community about how to deal with the potential for 
vendors to be compromised by law enforcement at any time. In much the same way as the 
administration team was forced to “assume the worst” in the case of Team Honesty, senior 
community members argue that there is no real way to “‘'take care to select your seller with 
caution and common sense. They aren’t always what they seem. Act as if every one of them 
is clueless and is unable to maintain their own security.” Reviews tell users nothing about 
vendors’ internal security arrangements. The only time it becomes apparent that a vendor’s 
opsec was lacking is after the fact, when they are arrested, and even then it is unclear for just 
how long they were compromised. 
One user argues that “Bigger and more established do not imply more reliable and 
trustworthy. Over and over we have found that those who say they are secure are not. The 
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longer you are on the darknet, the bigger you get, there’s more interest from LE and more 
time for things to go wrong and the longer the trail you leave for them to pick up.” Longevity 
gives no indication that a vendor is doing things properly, and might indicate that the vendor 
is at increased risk of downfall.  
At the same time, there is very little reason that users would purchase from vendors who 
were not established, and it appears that the only way that they would be willing to do so 
would be with the endorsement of comparatively known quantities. One user states, “The 
only reason I would have to start with a new vendor we don't know about would be if they 
were vouchsafed by a well known one.” They go on, “What it comes down to is your money 
is going to a stranger, and you have to take a risk with them if you purchase drugs on the 
darknet. That puts your safety in their paws.” 
Likewise, the administrators have struggled to negotiate the changing environment of the 
cryptomarkets, where fewer reputable cryptomarkets up and running means that fewer 
vendors are able to establish themselves as reputable. This shows how the cryptomarkets 
work as a connected market ecosystem, rather than a series of disparate unconnected 
platforms. Reputation on one is crucial to reputation on another. Not having its own 
reputation system made PFM dependent on the wider cryptomarket system. One 
administrator complains, “There is no way a seller can demonstrate their chops unless they 
are well ensconced here. The reason is that to apply the vendor has to have been on for most 
of a year and have a large numbers of reviews elsewhere. It becomes more difficult to 
demonstrate that record when many cryptomarkets are offline.” While PFM acts as a refuge 
it still relies upon other cryptomarkets as means of acquiring new vendors. The only way 
around this, for the administrators, is to defer to the judgement of those they already trust: 
“There is a way by which sellers can start themselves off. A top seller can put in a word for 
them, the upshot is that the top seller has to cover any costs that the new vendor incurs so 
new vendors can start.”   
Contested Knowledge Problems 
One way in which users invest in the PFM community is through participating in intensive 
discussions on what drugs can be sold through it. One poster describes the birth of the PFM 
(as forum) and the people who created it: 
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The PFM site in fact is the creation of a bunch of folks who started in the Silk 
Road. At that time the psychedelic market in the darknet was wall to wall 
crooks. Team PFM began with testing drugs being sold as LSD. They showed 
up crooks and validated honest, dependable sellers. Doing that meant that 
the cryptomarkets could be places where LSD could be sold honestly and 
reputably. 
We can examine one controversy to demonstrate the way that trust in and respect for the 
administrators is invoked as a means of enforcing rules and setting boundaries for the drug 
trade. PFM declares that drugs sold must broadly have low addiction and harm potential and 
significant use for self-exploration. They permit cannabis, LSD, MDMA, psilocybin and DMT. 
Specifically banned are “Spice and other artificial cannabis types, speed and associated 
analogues, GHB and anything you might expect: cocaine, Oxycontin, crystal meth and the 
like”. The banned drugs include a range of drugs commonly associate with problems of 
addiction, overdose and harmful behaviour. For example, GHB is often characterised as a drug 
that facilitates sexual assault. 
A live controversy revolves around ketamine. There have been significant issues with 
ketamine access, with “an American shortage of Ketamine which has sent prices up three 
times over the decade”. In addition, “ketamine can’t really be replaced [substituted by the 
user]” as opposed to many other substances that are difficult to acquire but have substitutes 
readily available. In August 2017, a user created a “petition to add ketamine to list of 
approved substances”. The moderators’ stance was that “there are no future plans to 
approve Ket for sale due to its potential for causing dependence. The continuous use of it 
creates health risks which we know well. We are not going to allow it or be part of it.” The 
poster responds that “there are other substances on sale here which could be as dependence 
inducing at Ket” and “a single dependable seller could fix the K shortage and also limit the 
number of phony and cut drugs being sold”. 
An administrator weighs in, “Take a small town and hand a thousand folk ten grams of K each. 
What proportion would show dependence, how many might OD, or use it to sexually assault 
people? Most people in PFM would not misuse it however we cannot let these sales happen.” 
The root of the controversy in this instance appears to be that members trust this forum over 
and above any other, and so are upset that they are unable to source what they consider to 
15 
be an important and useful drug there. One member asks, “Do any forums on the darknet 
permit K to be bought and discussed? Reddit's rules now make it difficult and shady and the 
cryptomarkets are full of scammers or useless.”  
The reason the administrators refuse to compromise on their principles is not just to avoid 
the potential attention that would be drawn by allowing ketamine dealers on to their site, 
and nor is it simply a matter of concern for addictive potential. Instead, it can be accounted 
for by the need for the administrators to be seen to be consistent, and to maintain the 
integrity of the forum as a space where only certain kinds of activities are facilitated and 
condoned. These negotiations of what can be sold on PFM serve a harm reduction purpose 
and demonstrate users’ personal investment  
Discussion 
The illicit economy is closely intertwined with the formal economy and changes in both go 
tougher closely. The illicit drug economy introduced a Fordist, low skill criminal economy into 
the world during the 1980s (Ruggiero, 2001).  Divisions of labour grew, roles were de-skilled 
and more easily entered into or abandoned. Whereas crime service producers were one the 
major players in the illicit economy, now criminal service consumers are (Ruggiero and South, 
1997). Likewise digital criminal activity was for a time dominated by the work of skilled actors 
embedded in hacker communities (Steinmetz, 2015). The emergence of online illicit markets 
means that their participants can be less technically skilled and work in less densely 
networked and more disperse groups (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2016). Indeed the bulk of 
online illicit drug transactions take place through location apps, websites, and social media, 
in what are highly technically insecure environments (Bakken and Demant, 2019; Moyle et 
al., 2019). This presents risks for participants as it exposes them to relatively easy 
compromise. PFM addresses these challenges by mutual oversight of members. 
The kind of trust PFM exemplifies is a lateral relation, exemplified by solidarity and 
recognition of common interest, rather than a vertical reliance on administrators and owners 
that other markets attempt to inculcate. Participants have a shared commitment to the idea 
of PFM as a purposeful community. Members justified their activity by demonstrating how 
they took more care for people’s health and psychological wellbeing than straight society and 
other cryptomarkets.  Trust was a quality articulated by the moral community of PFM and it 
underlay their expressed ideology and the choices they made about what was sold and why. 
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The relationship between the discussion forum and the market function is an essential aspect 
for its success. PFM emphasised trust taking place within a bounded community who are 
interested in psychedelics. Larger markets with a more laissez faire policy to products for sale 
are not likely to have the inbuilt community support that this one did. 
Users favourably compare their experience on PFM to other communities they have found on 
the clearnet. They locate that difference in quality of experience in two specific aspects. First, 
they care about the capacity to source drugs. Presumably the reason that they enjoy 
participating in this community in addition to buying drugs, rather than simply buying here 
and talking elsewhere, is because they see some value to the combination of the two. We 
posit that trust in product and vendors is in part a function of trust in the other people who 
also purchase that product or from those vendors. Second, they locate the difference in 
culture in the different kinds of drugs sold on this forum. Their objection to opioids is partly 
ethical, but they also see communities that sell these drugs as being “hostile” and “giving drug 
users a bad name”. This echoes the discussion around ketamine where administrators and 
users alike were wary of the impacts selling it might have upon the constitution of the 
community itself.  
In other threads, users engage in discussions about topics as banal as what they ate that day 
and as profound as what it means to experience “ego death” whilst tripping on LSD. There is 
personal disclosure from people on the forum who find it a place where they can relax and 
talk about the things that matter to them without fear of judgement or legal trouble, and with 
the certainty that there are other people who share their interests. The community thrives 
not just because of the pragmatic concern that users should trust the people reviewing the 
people who are going to sell them illicit mind-altering substances. It thrives because there are 
bonds of interdependence being formed between like-minded people who feel as though 
they are not completely at home elsewhere, even in other places where drugs can be bought 
and sold. 
PFM participants replaced trust in personal relationships and trust in technology with a hybrid 
of reputation and know-how. Moving away from relying on centralised escrow and PGP could 
show that some of these technologies were more used as performances of trust, theatre of 
security, than because they actually provided reliable service. For example, scams are built 
into vendors and buyers’ cost calculations. ‘Don’t trust the tech’ is part of a geek orientation 
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to technology. In stating that one relies on one’s own assembly of the technology one shows 
one’s agency and how the user is in charge of the technology rather than the other way 
around.  
Participants relied on their personal encryption methods as PFM did not run its own reliance 
on the cryptomarkets’ own technology exposes users to risk. In the event of the markets’ 
systems being compromised all users are potentially exposed and this was what compromised 
users of Alphabay, Hansa and other markets (Afilipoaie and Shortis, 2018). So this tells us 
about how market actors respond to threats and what makes particular markets more or less 
resilient than others. Law enforcement takedowns tend to make use of darknet and 
blockchain analysis technology to investigate markets and assume that users place the same 
value on the technology they do, but this may be incorrect. 
In the PFM community the acquisition of ‘trustworthiness’ is as a key status marker of the 
group. This develops the insight of Luhmann (2000) that norms and values of a particular 
community define the boundaries of its membership and define what is to count as trust and 
who is trustworthy. We take this insight further because mistrust is not just negation of trust. 
Rather it is a fundamental building block of the generation of trust in this specific 
environment. The generalised mistrust imposed by the forum administrators and adopted by 
all participants of the forum becomes key to group formation and underpins the conception 
of trust which operates in this collective. It is one which becomes a ‘collective good’ and acting 
as a status marker of ‘belonging’ to this particular collective (Barnes, 1992). It is a collective 
good which is key not only to group formation but to the internal organisation of inter-
individual’ interactions and group dynamics.  
Conclusion  
Law enforcement strategies have  tended to focus on the affordances of technology as the 
driving force in cybercrime (European Union, 2017). We have illustrated a case where users’ 
shared understanding of the purpose of the market and the carefully self-imposed limits of 
the technology they use are key to the stability and security of their market. This techno-
social approach has implications for how we understand the combination of criminal 
motivations, technology and community that forms each online illicit market. Users’ cultural 
competence is central to their ability to navigate the market and the signals that they send to 
others regarding their trustworthiness. In addition this organisational  arrangement is used 
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to govern what drugs are sold and for what purpose, and makes PFM a place where drugs are 
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